Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:07:11am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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A02: VAT Design and Compliance
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Wait No More: How the Administration of VAT Refunds Impacts Firm Behavior 1: University of Barcelona, Spain; 2: Stellenbosch University; 3: University of California, Irvine We show that the promised production efficiency of an ideal VAT is sensitive to its practical, administrative choices. We study the response of exports and zero-rated domestic sales to delays in refunds of VAT credits in South Africa. Although South Africa officially issues refunds immediately, delaying these refunds were a key part of the "State Capture" episode between 2015 and 2018. We find that smaller exporters and sellers of zero-rated domestic goods of all sizes, increase their output by 20 percent once refunds were issued promptly. Our findings suggest that timely VAT refunds are crucial to preserving production efficiency in a VAT and that tax administrations can meaningfully affect these delays even if \emph{de jure} they are required to be paid immediately.
Testing the Money Machine: VAT Adoption and Tax Revenue Performance 1: CUNEF Universidad; 2: International Monetary Fund; 3: World Bank Group We study the impact of adopting the value-added tax (VAT) on countries' tax revenue performance. Applying an event-study design and using panel data for 74 countries that introduced a VAT between 1986 and 2015, we estimate that adopting the VAT increases the tax-to-GDP ratio by about 0.7 percentage points on average. The effect is larger, up to 2 points of GDP, for low- and middle-income countries, in particular those located in Africa. The increase in VAT revenue more than offsets the decline in other indirect taxes—particularly trade taxes—consistent with VAT adoption replacing more distortionary sources of revenue, while income tax revenue remains broadly unchanged following adoption.
Legal Form and Tax Compliance: Diffuse Bunching in the Czech VAT Charles University, Czech Republic (Czechia) In this paper I use Czech administrative tax data from 2015-2023 to study whether there are differences between compliance behavior of firms and self-employed individuals at the VAT registration threshold. I apply the novel diffuse bunching framework of Anagol et al. (2025) to analyze whether bunching responses are motivated by a tax notch, fixed costs of VAT registration or optimization frictions. I find that their underlying revenue elasticity with respect to the tax rate is similar (around 0.24), suggesting comparable responses to tax incentives. However, the two groups differ substantially in their perceived fixed costs of VAT registration and their ability to choose optimal revenue. I find that self-employed individuals face 3 times higher fixed costs of registering to the VAT. I also find that firms exhibit much lower optimization frictions than self-employed individuals.
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