Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
Please select a date to show only sessions at that day. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
Activate "Show Presentations" and enter your name in the search field in order to find your function (s), like presenter, discussant, chair.
Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:03am WEST
|
Daily Overview |
| Session | |
|
C10: Wages, Labour Market Power, and Outsourcing Location: Room 110 (Francesinhas 1) | |
    | |
Who Gets the Rents? Labor Market Power, Reforms, and Worker Sorting University of Michigan, United States of America This paper examines how a major Peruvian labor-market reform reallocates rents among firms, workers, and the state when employers possess wage-setting power and workers can exit into informality. It studies the shift from a preferential agrarian regime with low profit taxes and reduced non-wage labor costs to a more pro-worker package that raised taxes, strengthened benefits and protections, and curtailed outsourcing. First, I estimate difference-in-differences and event-study models using ENAHO and EEA to document changes in wages, employment, and the wage–benefit–amenity bundle, and to track worker reallocation across the special regime, the general formal regime, and informality. Second, I develop and estimate a structural model that combines oligopsonistic wage posting with a regime-level discrete-choice model of heterogeneous workers. The model recovers labor-supply elasticities, markdowns, and preference heterogeneity, then decomposes incidence and welfare effects by worker type and outside options. Counterfactuals compare observed outcomes to competitive wages and quantify revenue changes.
| |
