Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:40:00am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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A06: Climate Risk, Adaptation, and Optimal Climate Policy Location: Room 106 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Optimal Climate Policy with Incomplete Markets University of Groningen, Netherlands, The How should governments design climate policies in the presence of inequality, uninsurable risk, and fiscal constraints? To address this question, we develop a climate-economy model with incomplete markets and idiosyncratic labor-income risk, where Ricardian equivalence fails and optimal long-run capital taxes are positive, leading to important inter-temporal wedges. We analytically show that the optimal carbon tax equals the social cost of carbon (SCC) adjusted for fiscal distortions. Calibrating the model to the U.S., we show that these adjustments are quantitatively negligible: high levels of household inequality, income risk, and fiscal distortions do not, in themselves, justify lowering climate ambitions. Welfare gains under the optimal policy come almost entirely from efficiency and environmental amenities, with almost no effect on redistribution and insurance, and are fairly evenly distributed across households.
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