Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:39am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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G09: Place-Based Policies and Local Economic Development Location: Room 109 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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The Effect Of Place-Based Subsidies Under Monopsonistic Competition: Evidence From The Empowerment Zones Program University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, United States of America In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium spatial model to study the effects of place-based subsidies under monopsonistic competition. In our model, firms and workers are perfectly mobile across a continuum of communities. Firms are locally oligopolistic, facing the downward sloping supply curve in a given community. The incidence of place-based policy falls on workers, landlords, and firms, the last of which has been traditionally left out of place-based policy analysis. Our model produces three sufficient statistics to evaluate the effect of place-based subsidies: changes in worker wages, landlord rents, and firm profits. We take the model to the U.S. administrative tax microdata to understand the extent of imperfect competition within local communities designated federal Empowerment Zones (EZs). We go on to provide the first long-run estimate of the program on worker welfare and evaluate how these results vary based on the degree of wage markdowns in each EZ.
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