Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:40:24am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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D09: Financing the State in Emerging Economies Location: Room 109 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Optimal Public-Private Partnerships\\ with Endogenous Financial Structure 1: University of Padua & CRIEP, Italy; 2: University of Padua & CRIEP, Italy This paper studies how the financial structure of public–private partnerships (PPPs) shapes incentives and project continuation. We develop a two-stage model of sequential moral hazard in which a private firm finances infrastructure through a mix of equity and bank debt. The firm chooses managerial effort and an endogenous continuation threshold after a liquidity shock, which occurs during the building phase. In equilibrium, memory-based contracts arise despite external financing. High performance in the building phase increases both the probability of continuation and operational effort. The model predicts that the effect of leverage on project survival depends on the net financing spread between the interest rate and the firm’s loss tolerance: when financing costs are moderate, debt reduces the likelihood of termination; when costs are high, this effect weakens. Using global project-level data (2006–2024), we find strong empirical support for these predictions.
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