Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:14am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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B04: Tax Competition Location: Room 104 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Taming Tax Competition: The Role of Urban Amenities University of Tokyo, Japan The literature in urban economics has highlighted the importance of urban amenities. This study shows that urban amenities also play a significant role in spatial tax competition. We incorporate urban consumption amenities into a spatial tax competition model in which regions compete for spatially mobile tax bases. In the model, consumers engage in cross-border shopping by purchasing goods in regions with lower tax rates. We find that the presence of urban amenities raises equilibrium tax rates not only in the region containing the city center but also in surrounding regions. This upward effect is heterogeneous across regions. Consequently, urban amenities mitigate tax competition and generally enhance the fiscal capacity of local governments. They may serve as an alternative to tax coordination or subsidies in addressing the inefficiency of low equilibrium tax rates under tax competition.
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