Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:42am WEST
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C03: Digital Economy Taxation and International Tax Allocation Location: Room 103 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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The Sufficient Statistics Approach Applied to International Tax Policy NHH Norwegian School of Economics, Norway This paper extends the sufficient statistics approach to study international tax policy. International policy differs from domestic policies because i) from the perspective of domestic policy makers the welfare weight assigned to foreign agents is lower than that of domestic agents, and ii) behavioral changes by foreign agents have spillover effects on the domestic economy that are welfare relevant. I develop a tax and tax administration model that incorporates these features. I ask which elasticities are required to estimate the welfare effects of an international (tax) policy reform, considering variation in both the tax rate and tax administration. The sufficient statistics needed for welfare analysis are the elasticity of taxable income, the elasticity of factor prices, and the elasticity of the foreign input with respect to the policy variable of interest. I apply the approach to calculate the welfare effects of the US corporate tax and U.S. tariffs on imports.
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