Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:36:57am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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E11: Optimal Pension System Design and Ageing Location: Room 112 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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History Dependence of Pension Systems Tehran Institiute for Advances Studies, Khatam University, Iran, Islamic Republic of In defined-benefit pension systems such as U.S. Social Security, retirement benefits depend on a history-dependent transformation of past earnings: lifetime earnings are condensed into Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME), typically averaging the top 35 years. This rule embeds redistribution and work incentives, yet its effects are hard to quantify because AIME is a nonlinear, non-smooth function of earnings histories. I develop a structural life-cycle model of labor supply, retirement, and earnings risk, solved with a novel deep neural network that learns the mapping from full earnings histories to benefits. Evaluating alternative rules—top 20, top 5, and lifetime averaging—I find that counting fewer years modestly raises consumption and redistributes toward workers with volatile earnings, while lifetime averaging increases labor supply and retirement ages and amplifies inequality. The earnings-summarization formula is central to redistribution, insurance, and incentives.
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