Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:04am WEST
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A13: Unemployment Insurance and the Safety Net: Design, Spillovers, and Integrity Location: Room 114 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Social Insurance with Imperfect Eligibility Screening: Theory and Evidence from Pandemic UI 1: JHU, United States of America; 2: GWU, United States of America; 3: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, United States of America This paper studies social insurance with imperfect eligibility screening, focusing on Unemployment Insurance during its expansion in 2020-21. We study the extent of imperfect screening by identifying anomalous payments using administrative tax data and UI policies, finding $214 billion in potentially-improper payments—concentrated in the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) program—with half detectable ex-ante through improved data sharing. There is substantial geographic variation, and a border design shows this is partly due to state policy decisions. To assess implications for optimal policy, we first conduct simulations that replace PUA with means tested, lump-sum transfers, finding these transfers would have better insured against income losses at lower administrative cost. Second, we develop a model of opt-in versus automatic transfers that shows the targeting advantage of opt-in programs can reverse when ineligible recipients pass the benefit screen. Calibrated to 2020 UI, the model implies that shifting toward automatic transfers would have increased social welfare.
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