Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
Please select a date to show only sessions at that day. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
Activate "Show Presentations" and enter your name in the search field in order to find your function (s), like presenter, discussant, chair.
Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:40:00am WEST
|
Daily Overview |
| Session | |
|
F13: Optimal Income Taxation: New Directions Location: Room 114 (Francesinhas 1) | |
    | |
Optimal Income Taxation and Education Subsidies When Education Improves the Signal About Ability University of Michigan, United States of America This paper studies the joint design of nonlinear income taxes and education subsidies when schooling raises productivity, signals ability, and improves employers' information, thereby enhancing worker--task assignment. I develop a model in which these roles operate jointly. Under utilitarian welfare, marginal education subsidies of roughly -60 to -70 percent are optimal across the spending distribution, primarily because of the externality generated by signaling. Signal precision reduces the magnitude of these negative subsidies by about 5 percentage points because better worker-specific information weakens employers' reliance on credentials. With stronger redistributive preferences, the education-subsidy schedule becomes progressive: subsidies remain strongly negative at low spending margins, become less negative at higher margins, and turn positive near the top. Precision-driven ability--wage sorting becomes more socially valuable when income taxation is redistributive because it improves task assignment, raises output, affects tax revenue, and makes income a more informative proxy for latent ability.
| |
