Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:40am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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B06: Municipal Finances under Revenue Shocks and Fiscal Rules Location: Room 106 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Debt Finance and Formal Debt Limits: Exploring Municipal Debt Policy Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany This paper explores the effects of institutional debt limits on municipal borrowing in the United States. A theoretical analysis shows that forward-looking governments facing a debt limit take precautionary measures to preserve budgetary flexibility in the event of adverse shocks. Specifically, they plan lower deficits and rely on alternative debt instruments. We test these predictions using a panel of US municipalities, exploiting the design of state-imposed debt limits. Our results show that tight limits are reflected in lower levels of restricted debt and induce municipalities to shift borrowing toward unrestricted but more expensive debt instruments. These responses are concentrated among municipalities that have already exhausted a substantial share of their legal borrowing capacity; for these municipalities the limit also restrains total borrowing, indicating that substitution between restricted and unrestricted instruments is only partial.
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