Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:15am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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B03: Optimal Redistribution and Labour Supply Location: Room 103 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Motivated or Frustrated? Aspirations and Optimal Taxation University of Michigan Standard optimal tax formulas treat the equity-efficiency tradeoff as independent of how taxation reshapes social comparisons. When aspirations are socially determined, reforms that shift the income distribution move individuals' reference points, creating additional welfare and revenue effects beyond the classic labor-leisure margin. I embed endogenous aspirational thresholds in a Mirrleesian model and derive sufficient-statistics formulas for optimal linear and nonlinear income taxes. The key new statistic is an aspiration elasticity: the response of taxable income to a change in aspirations, which governs whether higher aspirations motivate or frustrate effort. Using a U.S. online information-provision experiment with hypothetical choice scenarios, I estimate this elasticity to be 0.10-0.25 and find that aspirations predominantly motivate across the income distribution. Consistent with these estimates, standard formulas can overstate optimal progressivity. The framework also characterizes when pay-transparency policies raise welfare by correcting misperceptions and increasing the salience of reference incomes.
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