Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:33am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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D06: Corporate Tax Bases, Book-Tax Gaps, and Avoidance Location: Room 106 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Within-Country Profit-Shifting: From Treat To Threat? Catholic University Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, Germany In recent years, several policies – in particular those introduced in the wake of the OECD’s BEPS project – have made it much more difficult for MNEs to shift profits to low-tax countries. We show that in response, MNEs have restructured their tax strategies and now exploit within-country tax avoidance possibilities more strongly. To do so, we exploit the specific corporate tax structure in Germany, where municipal profit taxes vary between 7 and 20.3 percent. We show that profits become more sensitive to within-country tax differentials over time, consistent with firms shifting more profits within Germany after the BEPS reforms than they did before. By contrast, responsiveness to international tax rate differentials does not increase during the same period. Effects are driven by firms that are part of a multinational entity, but not part of a tax-consolidated group. The increase in local profit shifting is based on non-debt shifting channels.
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