Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
Please select a date to show only sessions at that day. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
Activate "Show Presentations" and enter your name in the search field in order to find your function (s), like presenter, discussant, chair.
Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:43am WEST
|
Daily Overview |
| Session | |
|
E12: Third-Party Reporting, Audit Targeting, and Non-Filing Location: Room 113 (Francesinhas 1) | |
| Presentation 3 | |
Optional Non-Filing And Tax Over-Withholding: Evidence From South Africa 1: University of Muenster, Germany; 2: University of Oslo, Norway Tax withholding in pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) systems is common across developing countries and considered essential for the effective enforcement of personal income taxation. To limit administrative burdens, PAYE is often coupled with generous tax non-filing options. Drawing on rich tax administrative data for South Africa, we show that such PAYE systems are associated with sizable and non-refunded over- withholding of taxes, raising taxpayers’ effective tax rates above legally applicable rates. Vulnerable taxpayer groups – low-income workers, young taxpayers and indi- viduals who recently entered the formal labor market – are disproportionally affected. PAYE over-withholding can deter formal labor supply and impair the progressivity of the personal income tax schedule.
| |

