Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:39am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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B04: Tax Competition Location: Room 104 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Competition with Multiple Instruments 1: University of California, Irvine; 2: University of Cologne; 3: Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Germany Interjurisdictional competition is central to public finance, yet most empirical work studies a single policy instrument. This is at odds with fiscal federalism in practice, where lower-tier governments set multiple instruments simultaneously and interdependently. We study multi-instrument tax competition using German municipalities exploiting roughly 30,000 business tax and 37,000 property tax changes. Estimating a distributed lag model to identify policy response functions within and between municipalities and across tax instruments, we find strong evidence that business and property tax rates are strategic complements. Complementarities arise within municipalities, across municipalities within the same tax, and across municipalities across taxes. These results imply that standard within-instrument approaches can overstate the slope of the response function by attributing joint multi-instrument adjustment to strategic interaction in a single tax.
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