Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
Please select a date to show only sessions at that day. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
Activate "Show Presentations" and enter your name in the search field in order to find your function (s), like presenter, discussant, chair.
Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:40:00am WEST
|
Daily Overview |
| Session | |
|
E02: Pension Design and Retirement Incentives Location: Room 102 (Francesinhas 1) | |
| Presentation 4 | |
Incentives vs. Insurance in Pension Design: Evidence from Earnings- and Means-tested Pension Benefits 1: London School of Economics, CenTax; 2: University of Copenhagen, CEBI This paper investigates the trade-off between insurance and incentives in pension benefit design by comparing the distributional and distortionary impacts of means- and earnings-tested pension benefits before and after retirement. I use reform-induced variation in retirement options and saving possibilities to document the distributional effects of means- and earnings-testing and estimate the behavioral effects on individuals' labor supply and saving decisions of the resulting high effective marginal tax rates.
| |

