Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:40:18am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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A09: Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Default Location: Room 109 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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The Economics of Comparability of Treatment in Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1: University of los Andes, Chile, Chile; 2: Columbia University; 3: Columbia University A key conflict in sovereign debt restructurings is the distribution of debt relief among creditors, who demand that the losses they face are “comparable” to those of other creditors. The matter becomes more complex when the universe of creditors is heterogeneous. The subject of “comparable treatment” (CoT) across creditors is poorly defined in theory and practice, and noticeably absent from the economics literature. We aim to fill this gap by undertaking three goals. First, we develop an economic framework to define the problem of CoT and its key inputs: debt relief, creditor heterogeneity, and loss allocation rules. Second, we explore the economic principles behind different fairness criteria by considering social planners with varying objectives. Third, we examine how current criteria to assess CoT at policy institutions match these fairness rules.
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