Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:40am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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F14: Tax Administration and State Capacity in Developing Countries Location: Room 116 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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How Do Individuals Respond to an Offshore Tax Amnesty? Evidence from Brazil 1: Paris School of Economics; 2: Banco Central do Brasil This paper analyzes Brazil’s 2016 offshore tax amnesty, implemented ahead of the increase in monitoring capacity under the OECD Common Reporting Standard. Using administrative microdata on the universe of reported foreign assets, we find that 21,000 individuals disclosed $59 billion (3.4% of GDP). Participation was strongly correlated with wealth, reaching 21% among the top 0.001%. However, using microdata on foreign exchange, we show that net capital repatriation was limited, averaging only 20% of disclosed assets. Most wealth remained abroad, driven by high foreign returns and diversification benefits. Tracking repatriated capital, we find it flowed mainly into domestic fixed income rather than the real economy. Consequently, firms owned by amnesty participants showed no growth in employment or revenues, although they significantly substituted external debt with proprietary capital. These results suggest that while amnesties effectively uncover hidden wealth, they are insufficient to fundamentally shift capital allocation.
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