Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:52am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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F08: Optimal Taxation: Public Goods and Income Tax Design Location: Room 108 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Optimal Public-Good Reforms with Willingness-to-Pay Elicitation PUC Rio, Brazil Applied welfare analysis relies on willingness-to-pay estimates. When the government provides goods that are non-rival or non-excludable, however, willingness to pay is hard to elicit. We characterize a local direct mechanism that truthfully elicits status-quo marginal willingness to pay under general preferences. Allowing arbitrary welfare weights and policy costs that include fiscal externalities generated by mechanism transfers, we characterize the welfare-maximizing local public-good reform at each report profile. The reform is locally incentive compatible when its implemented weighted marginal value of public funds exceeds the welfare cost of raising a public dollar through the residual financing margin. Otherwise, characterizing the constrained second-best mechanism requires additional analysis.
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