Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
Please select a date to show only sessions at that day. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
Activate "Show Presentations" and enter your name in the search field in order to find your function (s), like presenter, discussant, chair.
Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:40:48am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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A13: Unemployment Insurance and the Safety Net: Design, Spillovers, and Integrity Location: Room 114 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Do Disability Benefit Claims Rise When Other Benefits Are Cut? 1: Institute for Fiscal Studies, United Kingdom; 2: King's College London; 3: University College London What is the role of income in driving the choice to claim disability benefits, and how can broader benefit policy affect that? We study three UK reforms which cut non-disability benefits and find that each increased the number of individuals receiving disability benefits, with an elasticity of claims to incomes between -0.4 and -1.1. Our results provide causal evidence that disability benefits provide insurance against non-health related shocks. These effects have implications for the optimal level of non-disability benefit generosity, and the savings policymakers might hope to generate from benefit cuts.
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