Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:14am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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E04: Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Equalisation Location: Room 104 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Do Federal Fiscal Rules Discipline Local Governments? Evidence From Germany Walter Eucken Institute, Germany Do national fiscal rules affect lower-tier governments that are not formally bound by them? I study Germany's debt brake, which constrained the federation and, prospectively, the states but not municipalities. Using a regression kink design exploiting a major German state’s municipal equalization formula, I test whether the reform changed how municipalities adjust expenditure, borrowing, repayment, and tax rates when unconditional grants increase at the margin. I find no robust evidence that municipalities changed their marginal budget response to grants. Additional grants do not become more strongly associated with fiscal consolidation, while shifts toward current goods and services and away from investment fail criteria based on timing, persistence, mechanism, and debt heterogeneity. These patterns align more closely with the financial crisis and the transition to accrual accounting than with debt-brake-induced vertical transmission through the municipal grant margin. Complementary synthetic-control evidence on debt and transfer dependence is consistent with this interpretation.
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