Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:36:57am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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C05: Property Taxation: Design, Incentives, and Housing Location: Room 105 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Municipal Choices Over Land Value tax vs. Building Taxes 1: VATT Institute of Economic Research, Finland; 2: University of Helsinki, Finland In 2024, Finland split the general municipal property tax into land and building components, creating a de facto land value tax (LVT). We study the adoption and early consequences of this reform for municipal public finance. We document how municipalities set LVT rates and whether they offset land taxation by lowering other tax rates, or by adjusting spending, investment, and borrowing. For identification, we exploit quasi-experimental variation induced by statutory minimum rates that bound local LVT choices. The project delivers the first comprehensive evidence on the implementation margins of an LVT in a contemporary setting, informing the design of property taxation and the fiscal instruments available to local governments.
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