Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:40:24am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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G11: Fiscal Rules, Tax Expenditures, and Sovereign Risk Location: Room 112 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Point Break: When Fiscal Rules Turn Pro-Cyclical – Evidence From Debt Thresholds In The European Union 1: Sapienza University of Rome, Italy, Department of Economics and Law; 2: University of Pisa (Italy), Department of Economics and Management / Research Centre in Economics and Public Finance (CEFIP) The paper examines whether, and at what level of public debt, European fiscal rules are associated with different cyclical patterns of fiscal policy. Using ex ante fiscal plans and output gap forecasts from European Commission Autumn vintages for 26 EU countries (2008–2019), we estimate annual country-specific measures of fiscal cyclicality through time-varying coefficient models. To address simultaneity, we complement a time-varying specification with a novel instrumental-variable estimator based on kernel methods, using an external demand shifter as instrument. The estimated coefficients are then related to the strength of fiscal rules, relying on continuous indices from the IMF and the European Commission within a panel threshold framework. A robust debt threshold emerges at around 87% of GDP: above it, stronger rules are associated with greater pro-cyclicality; below it, the relationship is weak. These findings suggest that in high-debt environments rule-based surveillance may amplify cyclical pressures unless flexibility is explicitly debt-contingent.
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