Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:36:57am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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G12: Taxation at the Top: Earnings, Compensation, and Giving Location: Room 113 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Taxing High Wages: Evidence from the Netherlands 1: UC Berkeley, United States of America; 2: Leiden University We study the effects of a temporary tax on high wages levied on employers in the Netherlands. The tax imposed a 16 per cent surcharge on the portion of wages above €150,000 in 2012–2013. Using employer–employee data and tax returns, and combining bunching, difference-in-differences and triple-differences designs, we find no effect on employees’ wages, implying that employers bore the full burden of the tax. In contrast, owner-managers reduced their pay to offset the surtax. The response to the tax persists for many years after its repeal. To prevent income relabelling, anti-avoidance rules set a minimum level of compensation for owner-managers. We find no response among those for whom these rules bind, suggesting that they can effectively limit tax avoidance. Our results show that the capital-labour income split in private businesses is sensitive to tax laws, that temporary taxes can have long-lasting effects, and that elasticities are shaped by policy design.
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