Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:38am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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C16: Aggressive Tax Planning and the Shadow Economy Location: Room 008 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Negotiating Taxes 1: UC Berkeley, United States of America; 2: THEMA, CY Cergy Paris University While the OECD has advanced multilateral reforms to curb profit shifting, countries simultaneously engage in direct negotiations with multinational enterprises (MNEs) to protect their domestic tax base. Drawing on novel micro-data from the French tax authority, offering visibility into a process that is typically highly opaque, we study these negotiations, formally known as Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs). Leveraging the staggered entry of firms into negotiations between 2002 and 2025, we argue that these negotiations have mutual benefits. On the one hand, engaging in negotiation increases a firm’s domestic corporate tax base by about €15 million per year, roughly 2% of baseline sales, which translates into fiscal revenues for the tax authority. On the other hand, negotiations reduce the likelihood of transfer-pricing corrections by about 15 percentage points, providing greater certainty to firms. We also structurally estimate a Nash bargaining model to quantify each firm’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the tax authority.
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