Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:40am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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D08: Corrective and Commodity Taxation Location: Room 108 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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When Are Sin Taxes Effective? \\ From Preferences for Substitution to Elasticities 1: VATT Institute for Economic Research, Helsinki, Finland; 2: Labour Institute for Economics Research, LABORE; 3: Swansea University This paper studies when are sin taxes effective in affecting consumption. We organize the paper through a theory framework that characterizes how substitution preferences relate to elasticity of consumption: otherwise it is very small, but when two goods are very close substitutes the elasticity explodes to a large level. We also present a theory framework to analyze welfare in the presence of externalities. Empirically we analyze a Finnish sin tax scheme with quasi-experimental variation through multiple reforms. Our register data contains hundreds of millions of observations. We also provide survey evidence on substitution preferences across categories of goods. Our estimated consumption elasticities align very well with the theory framework, such that consumption elasticity is close to unity only for sugary soda for which the closest substitute is sugar-free soda. We also provide a meta-analysis to literature analyzing consumption elasticities and show that the elasticity estimates align with our theory framework.
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