Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:40:18am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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F15: The Rich, the Poor, and the Politics of Redistribution Location: Room 118 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Public Goods for the Rich and the Poor: Optimal Contributions to Heterogeneous Public Goods 1: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment; 2: University of Cambridge; 3: University of Oslo Public goods can be funded by private donations or government provision. With multiple public goods and heterogeneous preferences, the choice of funding method gives rise to a potential conflict between income groups. In this paper, we address the interaction between heterogeneous preferences over different public goods and how to fund them. There may be a conflict of interest between donors and governments when there is some public provision of public goods. This conflict can be resolved using differentiated subsidies. To analyse optimal policy we apply an 'agnostic welfare function', which highlights how the welfare treatment of warm glow motivations affects optimal policy. We provide sufficient conditions under which a differentiated subsidy welfare dominates public provision. Finally, we derive the structure of optimal public good funding by combining tax financed provision and differentiated or uniform donation subsidies.
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