Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:43am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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A05: Corporate Transparency and Tax Compliance Location: Room 105 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Corporate Tax Compliance under Enforcement Misperception 1: HEC Paris; 2: ifo Institute; 3: LMU Munich We study whether enforcement misperception arising from the opacity of tax audit systems is a feature or a bug of corporate tax compliance. Extending the seminal Allingham–Sandmo of tax evasion, firms can reduce tax liabilities via illegal evasion or legal but resource-costly avoidance. If managers overestimate audit intensity, they substitute from evasion toward avoidance rather than truthful reporting, leaving tax revenue largely unchanged while increasing deadweight costs (advisory fees, restructuring) and reducing penalty revenue. With a risk-averse manager facing personal liability, the model delivers a closed-form interior evasion choice and predicts a weaker response to perceived enforcement among more risk-averse managers. Empirically, we combine German firm survey data with administrative audit rates across German states and size classes to identify behavioral effects and quantify welfare losses.
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