Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:36:55am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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A05: Corporate Transparency and Tax Compliance Location: Room 105 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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The Power of Transparency: Evaluating the Role of Treaties in the Fight Against Tax Avoidance Utrecht University School of Economics, Netherlands We introduce a novel approach to analyze the role of international treaties for tax evasion, focusing on tax information exchange. First, we use a gravity model of bilateral Foreign Direct Investment to identify ‘investment anomalies’, which do not follow real economic determinants, and show that they are consistent with tax evasion patterns. We then add variables for tax information exchange to understand how these treaties are related to changes in tax evasion. We find that Double Taxation Agreements are associated with more investment, likely including evasion, while tax information exchange is associated with an average -6% reduction in tax evasion, primarily driven by OECD Country-by-Country Reporting and the EU Directive 2011/16 with effects up to -13%. This demonstrates that Double Taxation Agreements should always be paired with tax information exchange and that the implementation of Country-by-Country Reporting should be further promoted to reduce tax evasion.
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