Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:40:01am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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B02: Optimal Capital, Wealth, and Entrepreneurial Taxation Location: Room 102 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Optimal Taxation Of Entrepreneurial Income And Capital University of Münster, Germany Entrepreneurial taxation differs from standard Mirrlees income taxation because the entrepreneur’s effort is an input into her own production. As a result, taxing entrepreneurial income distorts not only effort but also the firm’s production plan and the demand for other inputs. This paper studies optimal nonlinear taxation when entrepreneurs differ in privately observed skill and the government observes only entrepreneurial income and capital. I derive conditions under which production efficiency with respect to capital is desirable and when a second-best capital tax (or subsidy) should accompany the income tax to offset incentive-driven distortions. With effort-augmenting skill and weak separability, a production-side analogue to Atkinson–Stiglitz implies that capital should not be taxed when capital demand does not vary across types at a given income. With capital-augmenting skill, the sign of the optimal capital instrument depends on technology curvature: declining capital elasticities favor a capital subsidy.
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