Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:40:19am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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D03: Tax Treaties and Cross-Border Profit Shifting Location: Room 103 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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When Outbound Payments Get Taxed: Multinational Profit Shifting Under Withholding Taxes 1: University of Bonn, Germany; 2: University of Münster; 3: Norwegian University of Life Sciences Many countries have introduced special withholding taxes on intra-firm payments to low-tax jurisdictions in order to curb multinational profit shifting. Yet little is known about their effectiveness. Using Norway as a testing ground and linking corporate tax returns to the universe of cross-border bank transfers, we show that the introduction of withholding taxes on haven- bound payments significantly reduced payment outflows to affected low-tax jurisdictions. Treated multinationals did not report higher taxable profits in Norway following the reform, however – but rather substituted to other profit shifting channels: Our evidence suggests that affected firms rerouted payments to low-tax jurisdictions within the European Economic Area, which are exempt from the Norwegian withholding tax.
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