Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
Please select a date to show only sessions at that day. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
Activate "Show Presentations" and enter your name in the search field in order to find your function (s), like presenter, discussant, chair.
Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:48am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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G10: Local Governance, Discretion, and Public Procurement Location: Room 110 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Decoding Local Public Finance: The Interplay of the Legislature and the Executive Tampere University, Finland This study examines how the size of political bodies affects local public finances in Italian municipalities. Using administrative data and a difference-in-differences approach, it shows that larger executives increase expenditures, mainly through investment spending financed by intergovernmental transfers, while larger councils tend to constrain spending. The results suggest that executive specialization and council fragmentation shape fiscal outcomes in opposite directions. Voters appear to reward executive-led spending, improving the political careers of mayors and executive members, but not councilors. Overall, the study shows how bargaining between differently sized branches of local government influences fiscal policy.
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