Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
Please select a date to show only sessions at that day. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:52am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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A16: Digital Technologies, Tax Compliance, and Capital Misallocation Location: Room 008 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Deaf to the Market, Listening to the State: the SCE Responses to Fiscal Policy and Capital Misallocation Peking University, China, People's Republic of Do standard fiscal policy tools work for state-owned enterprises (SOEs)? We address this question by exploiting a bonus depreciation policy in China as a quasi-natural experiment. Using a staggered difference-in-differences design on national tax survey data, we find that while private firms increase investment by 11% in response to the tax incentive, SOEs show no reaction on average—a result that holds even for the most financially constrained firms and those with high shares of private capital. However, we find that SOE investment is activated through a political channel: local SOEs increase investment only when their controlling governments face pressure from growth slowdown, revealing a dual mechanism for fiscal stimulus: market-based for private firms and political for state-owned firms.
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