Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
Please select a date to show only sessions at that day. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
Activate "Show Presentations" and enter your name in the search field in order to find your function (s), like presenter, discussant, chair.
Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:15am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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G02: Tariffs, Subsidies, and Industrial Policy in a Fragmented World Location: Room 102 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Picking Local Champions: Performance Driven Tax Incentives in China Peking University, China, People's Republic of This study investigates how local governments in China strategically deploy tax incentives to support firms with robust economic performance, fostering a symbiotic government-business relationship to advance local development objectives. Using firm-level data from the National Tax Survey, we find that sub-national governments tend to lower the effective tax rates for prominent local firms that make significant contributions to the local economy. This preferential treatment is more pronounced among local officials who face stronger career incentives or heightened pressure to promote economic growth. To address potential confounding factors such as political favoritism, tax avoidance strategies, or exclusive special deals, we employ quasi-experimental shocks and leadership turnover as identification strategies. Our findings also reveal a dual dynamic: while local business champions benefit from favorable tax policies, they are subjected to increased scrutiny, including a higher likelihood of tax audits and stricter penalties for tax evasion.
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