Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:38am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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E14: Profit Shifting, Tax Havens, and Cross-Border Financial Flows Location: Room 116 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Profit Shifting and Firm Dynamics: Explaining the Selection into Tax Havens Hitotsubashi University, Japan Anti–profit-shifting policies act on distinct firm margins, yet are often evaluated as a single category. I develop a continuous-time heterogeneous-firm model that separates three policy levers: the organizational cost of haven adoption (extensive margin), the marginal cost of shifting (intensive margin), and the statutory tax differential. A sunk adoption cost generates a band of inaction, while a convex shifting cost yields a closed-form shifting schedule increasing in firm size. Calibrated to 2019 U.S. data, the model shows that raising the adoption barrier leaves aggregate shifted profits nearly unchanged through an offsetting composition effect, whereas raising the marginal shifting cost or compressing the tax differential erodes or protects the tax base directly. In a Stackelberg tax-competition game, uncoordinated rate setting yields a welfare loss of about 7%, whereas a stylized Pillar Two floor at 21% eliminates strategic undercutting and raises welfare by about 10% relative to the calibrated baseline.
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