Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:44am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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D13: Labour Supply, Welfare Eligibility, and Minimum Income Schemes Location: Room 114 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Labor Supply Response to Benefit Salience Under Risk of Unemployment University of Freiburg / Walter Eucken Institut, Germany This study investigates how the connection of taxation to public benefits can decrease tax payers' perceived tax burden, affecting their labor-leisure decision. We present a model of tax and benefit (mis)-perception, in which payoff maximizing work effort increases when the perceived tax burden decreases. Increasing the salience of benefits funded by taxation and the probability of receiving them decreases this perceived tax burden. We use two real-effort online experiments to test the suppositions of the model. In a flat tax system, we find that lack of information on the accrual of benefits increases perceived tax burden and decreases labor supply. In a progressive tax system, we find that full benefit salience improves motivation to remain in the unemployment insurance system and that effort increases under benefit salience when the unemployment rate is high. As such, behavioral responses to the salience of benefits also requires the expectation of their need.
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