Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:32am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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E05: Local Budgeting, Oversight and Participatory Finance Location: Room 105 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Political Cycles and the Allocation of Targeted Project Grants for Schools 1: Chung-Ang University, Korea, Republic of (South Korea); 2: Incheon National University, Korea This study investigates how institutional features of South Korea’s education finance system influence the allocation of discretionary resources. Despite a shrinking school-age population, statutory indexing to national tax revenues has created a fiscal "windfall" in local education grants. Using a panel fixed-effects framework and a granular dataset of school-level expenditures and municipality election results, I analyze the distribution of Targeted Project Grants by elected provincial superintendents. The results reveal significant political distortions: a 1 percentage point increase in an incumbent’s prior vote share correlates with a 2.3% increase in per capita targeted funding. This "reward-based" allocation is more prevalent among progressive superintendents and typically occurs during the first half of the electoral term. These findings suggest that when fiscal constraints are relaxed, discretionary grants become primary instruments for political signaling and reciprocity rather than purely educational needs.
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