Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:40:23am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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E05: Local Budgeting, Oversight and Participatory Finance Location: Room 105 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Do I Know You? Fiscal Oversight of Familiar and Unfamiliar Municipalities German University of Administrative Sciences Speyer, Germany Regional favoritism by politicians can affect fiscal conditions of subnational governments. I empirically examine potential biases in municipal fiscal oversight between municipalities familiar to the supervisor and those newly incorporated under the supervisor’s jurisdiction and the implications for fiscal indicators. A reform in the German state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern reduced the number of counties within the federal state. As a result, some municipalities were assigned to a new fiscal supervisor. The findings indicate that municipalities unfamiliar to the supervisor increase their tax multipliers and reduce their levels of debt relative to familiar municipalities. Since these effects are absent for highly indebted municipalities, greater discretion associated with lower levels of municipal debt appears to allow the supervisor to treat municipalities differently based on familiarity. Overall, the results suggest that the supervisor may show favoritism toward familiar municipalities while imposing intensified consolidation pressure on unfamiliar municipalities.
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