Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
Please select a date to show only sessions at that day. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
Activate "Show Presentations" and enter your name in the search field in order to find your function (s), like presenter, discussant, chair.
Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:32am WEST
|
Daily Overview |
| Session | |
|
G10: Local Governance, Discretion, and Public Procurement Location: Room 110 (Francesinhas 1) | |
    | |
Political Capture and Bureaucratic Performance. Evidence from Mafia-Infiltrated Municipalities 1: Bocconi University, Italy; 2: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Italy When political leadership is captured, bureaucrats may either become instruments of corrupt rule or act as a buffer that constrains its effects. We examine these competing expectations in the context of Italian municipalities infiltrated by mafia organizations. Leveraging a 1991 law that allows the central government to dissolve captured municipal councils, we study how bureaucratic performance responds when political corruption is abruptly removed. Using a difference-in-differences design with matched controls based on a machine-learning index of mafia-infiltration risk, we show that dissolutions substantially reduce payment delays, indicating improved bureaucratic performance. Evidence from administrative data and investigative reports suggests these gains are driven by behavioral responses—such as improved morale and reduced shirking— and allows us to rule out alternative mechanisms. The findings show that political capture weakens state capacity by distorting politician–bureaucrat relations, and that bureaucracies can mitigate its downstream consequences rather than amplify them.
| |
