Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:26am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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D04: VAT Evasion, Enforcement, and Export Rebates Location: Room 104 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Can Export VAT Rebate Be Passed Through? 1: Hebei University of Economics and Business, China, People's Republic of; 2: University of International Business and Economics, China, People's Republic of; 3: Hohai University, China, People's Republic of The indirect tax burdens are generally assumed to be shifted fully or predominantly to buyers. Does the same logic apply to export VAT rebates? This study examines the tax incidence of export VAT rebates both empirically and theoretically. We take advantage of China's 2004 export VAT rebate as a natural experiment, and estimate the pass-through rate by employing the difference-in-differences approach. Combining the comprehensive product-level data from China Customs (2003-2004) and detailed export rebate rate information, we find that exporters bear 100% of the export VAT rebate burden. We further show that this reduction of export VAT rebates significantly lowers export quantities and values. We then develop a theoretical model examining the tax incidence of export rebates from one country. This model rationalizes our empirical finding that the burden cannot be shifted to foreign buyers. Our paper provides an insight into the distributional effects of export tax rebate policies.
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