Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:26am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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B09: Pensions, Retirement, and Saving Responses Location: Room 109 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Pension Eligibility Criteria In A Setting With Informality 1: Loyola Marymount University, United States of America; 2: Mount Holyoke College, United States of America In countries with robust informal labor markets, the required number of contributions to access a pension can influence formality. We study this phenomenon in the context of Brazil. We develop a theoretical life-cycle model that captures key dynamics of a contributory pension system design in a labor market with informality. Our analysis shows that the minimum years of required contributions play a central role in shaping the trade-off between higher immediate earnings in the informal sector and the accumulation of long-term pension through formal employment. Next, we examine how tightening eligibility criteria affects workers’ incentives to participate in the formal sector. We find heterogeneous responses: low-income workers, who derive greater short-term gains from informality, reduce formal participation and rely more heavily on the social pension, whereas middle-income workers increase formality to meet the stricter eligibility requirements. We find no impact for high-income workers who optimally choose to remain formal.
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