Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:52am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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B07: Firm Ownership, Wages, and Inequality Location: Room 107 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Does Ownership Matter? Allocation and Concentration of Firm Ownership ifo Institute & LMU Munich, Germany Most empirical work treats firms as stand-alone units, yet economic control is exercised through ownership networks. If owners differ in their ability to monitor, allocate capital, or organize production, then firm performance may depend on who owns the firm. This paper studies whether owners are heterogeneous in their association with firm outcomes and whether tax policy distorts the allocation of corporate control. Using a novel registry-based panel covering the universe of German firm–person ownership networks from 2002 to 2024, I link 5 million firms to 7 million individuals and observe ownership portfolios and transitions at scale. I estimate an AKM-style decomposition to quantify persistent owner-specific components in firm performance. The results provide new evidence on owner heterogeneity and concentration of firm ownership.
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