Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
Please select a date to show only sessions at that day. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:15am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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E10: Migration, Labour Markets, and Integration Policies Location: Room 110 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Randomization as an Incentive Device: Evidence from Public Procurement of Immigrant Integration Services 1: VATT Institute for Economic Research, Finland; 2: Aalto University School of Business We examine the impact of procuring services under a contract where a randomized research design serves as an incentive device. Immigrant job seekers were randomly assigned to either a private fund or public employment services, with the Private provider’s compensation tied to differences in average unemployment benefits and taxes between the two groups. We find that the private fund outperforms the public alternative, increasing earnings by 15%, improving job quality, and reducing the net burden on public finances by 12% over the three-year contract period. These positive effects extend to non-contracted outcomes and persist beyond the period during which the private provider’s incentives were in place. The effects are particularly pronounced for high-skilled participants. Our findings suggest that procurement contracts that credibly align the incentives of providers with public sector goals can significantly improve service quality.
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