Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:34am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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A03: Global Minimum Tax: Theory and Evidence Location: Room 103 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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The Welfare Effects of the Global Minimum Tax 1: European Commission, JRC-Seville, Spain; 2: Independent consultant based at European Commission, JRC-Seville, Spain; 3: CPB, Netherlands This paper presents a simple model in which a multinational enterprise operates in multiple non-haven jurisdictions where it has real economic activity and shifts paper profits to a tax haven. In this setting, we introduce a Global Minimum Tax (GMT) and analyse its consequences for the allocation of real economic activity and for profit shifting. The GMT is binding not only in the tax haven, but also potentially in other low tax jurisdictions. These jurisdictions are negatively affected in terms of capital allocation, but the resulting increase in tax revenues may offset this loss, which would lead to a net welfare gain. Unconstrained jurisdictions may gain or lose depending on their relative effective tax rates. Since the reform creates winners and losers, we examine its welfare implications under the assumption of no tax competition among jurisdictions and derive the conditions under which the GMT leads to a global welfare improvement.
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