Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
Please select a date to show only sessions at that day. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
Activate "Show Presentations" and enter your name in the search field in order to find your function (s), like presenter, discussant, chair.
Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:39am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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F16: Retirement Savings and Pension Finance Location: Room 008 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Who Measures Long-Term Liabilities? Actuaries and Public Pension Finance Federal Reserve Board, United States of America Institutions routinely delegate complex measurement to external experts, creating scope for expert judgment and discretion to shape reported information. This paper studies delegated measurement in state and local public pensions, where actuaries value long-term benefit promises that determine reported funding, required contributions, and fiscal risk. I use novel data linking plan-level financials to actuarial firms and valuation assumptions. Leveraging actuarial firm switches and malpractice litigation, I show that actuaries materially affect reported liabilities and funding status. Small actuarial firms, in particular, are associated with more favorable reporting. When an actuarial firm is sued for malpractice, its other public pension clients subsequently report stronger financials and use more aggressive assumptions, consistent with reputational and market incentives shaping expert discretion. Counterfactual exercises suggest that these forces shift aggregate reported liabilities by tens to hundreds of billions of dollars.
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