Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:34am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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G03: Profit Shifting: Measurement and Real Responses Location: Room 103 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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5:45pm - 6:07pm
Profit Shifting And Real Investment Activity 1: University of Tübingen, Germany; 2: RSIT; 3: Erasmus School of Economics; 4: NoCeT; 5: Tinbergen Institute; 6: CESifo This paper studies how profit shifting affects real investment by multinational corporations (MNCs). We model three main profit-shifting channels and show that two influence investment through the user cost of capital. For all channels, we identify conditions under which an MNC’s minimum tax rate affects investment in other affiliates. Using detailed micro-level data on foreign affiliates, we test these predictions with instrumental variable regressions and event study analyses. We find that incentives to shift profits to low-tax locations reflect in the user cost of capital in high-tax countries. A one percentage point increase in the local statutory tax rate reduces investment by about 0.55%, while the response to the MNC-specific minimum tax is considerably smaller. Beyond user costs, transfer pricing of intermediate goods also affects investment through the minimum tax rate. Overall, our findings inform evaluations of policies such as the Global Minimum Tax.
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