Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:15am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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B02: Optimal Capital, Wealth, and Entrepreneurial Taxation Location: Room 102 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Optimal Wealth Tax with Evasion and Financial Frictions University of Bristol, United Kingdom Recently, there have been calls for the introduction of a wealth tax. However the major concern is that a wealth tax induces evasion. This paper theoretically characterises the optimal wealth tax in a general equilibrium model with tax evasion and financial frictions deriving a new optimal tax formula consisting of three components. First, a redistribution term, reflecting the welfare gains from transferring resources toward agents with lower. Second, a general equilibrium-effects term. Third, a behavioural-effects term including the key elasticity of evasion with respect to taxes which depends on the curvature of the evasion costs and on the extent to which hidden wealth can be collateralised. The numerical exercise quantifies two main results. First, the higher the share of hidden wealth that cannot be collateralised, the lower the elasticity of evasion. Second, as the share of hidden wealth that cannot be collateralised increases, the planner chooses a higher tax rate.
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