Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:37am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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A12: Artificial Intelligence and Local Government Performance Location: Room 113 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Networks and Yardstick Competition in the Digital Age: Evidence from Italian Municipalities 1: University of Warwick; 2: Università di Roma La Sapienza; 3: University of Warwick; 4: Università di Bologna We investigate whether providing politicians with low-cost access to peer information influences fiscal behavior, exploiting an Italian program that allowed mayors to access detailed municipal expenditure data via a restricted website. By tracking digital activity, we construct a directed network of peer monitoring. We find that participating mayors are younger, more educated, and govern larger municipalities. Exploiting network intransitivity to address the reflection problem, we demonstrate that digital transparency fundamentally alters fiscal competition. Within the network, strategic interaction in property tax setting is conditional on electoral incentives, driven primarily by mayors eligible for re-election. Conversely, municipalities outside the network exhibit geographic correlation unrelated to term limits. These findings suggest that digital platforms facilitate sophisticated, reputation-based yardstick competition, demonstrating that transparency tools influence politician behavior even prior to public disclosure.
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