Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:40am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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B14: Collecting Taxes: Administration, Politics, and Enforcement Location: Room 116 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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The Political Economy of Tax Expenditures: Evidence for OECD Countries 1: Luiss University; 2: Paris Dauphine-PSL University; 3: Università di Roma La Sapienza, Italy; 4: University of Urbino Carlo Bo' Governments channel substantial fiscal policy through tax expenditures rather than through visible public spending, despite the well-known inefficiencies of tax expenditures. We argue that the politically relevant margin is not aggregate fiscal cost, but fragmentation into numerous legally distinct provisions, which reduces salience and weakens budget scrutiny. We develop a political-economy model with a rent-seeking firm, a vote-maximising politician, and a Treasury with enforcement capacity, micro-founding structural opacity as a function of the number of provisions. The model predicts that stronger Treasury enforcement unambiguously reduces fragmentation, while its effect on aggregate revenue foregone is theoretically ambiguous. Using a cross-country panel dataset from the Global Tax Expenditures Database and an instrumental-variables strategy based on the cultural substitution between exclusive family ties and generalised trust, we find that higher social capital significantly reduces the number of provisions but has no systematic effect on aggregate revenue foregone.
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