Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
Please select a date to show only sessions at that day. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
Activate "Show Presentations" and enter your name in the search field in order to find your function (s), like presenter, discussant, chair.
Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:40am WEST
|
Daily Overview |
| Session | |
|
A10: Carbon Taxes, Equity, and Corrective Reform Location: Room 110 (Francesinhas 1) | |
    | |
How to set Carbon Prices University of Cologne, Germany This paper addresses the design of Pigouvian taxes aimed at the climate externality in conjunction with other tax and transfer instruments. The analysis is split into two steps: First, the design of commodity-level carbon taxes, and second, the optimal recycling of the associated revenue. I show that the optimal pure carbon taxes differ from the benchmark of a Pigouvian tax, i.e., the marginal environmental damage. They are differentiated between commodities based on their carbon intensity, the behavioral effectiveness, and distributional concerns, i.e., the more emissions-intensive, elastic, and redistributionally unvaluable a good is, the higher the carbon tax on it. However, this policy is suboptimal if the planner has vertically redistributive preferences, and additional tax and transfer policies can increase welfare. If the tax system is sufficiently unrestricted, the Pigouvian benchmark is recovered through the interaction of the standard tax instruments with carbon prices.
| |
